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Abstract:  
This paper examines the supply of housing in the volume building sector in the context of 
housing supply shortage and lengthening construction times.  It aims to reveal organisation 
arrangements and work practices that may contribute to delays in building completion times. 
 
The paper begins by examining housing supply and delivery times in Australian cities, with 
statistical analysis establishing that there is an increasing gap between supply and demand, 
and along side this, a significant rising trend in construction times. The paper then examines 
the volume building sector in more detail, considering the changing nature of the housing 
commodity, the contracting system for organising labour and materials supply, and the 
management system for housing delivery. Drawing on industry analysis and interviews, the 
paper argues that existing contract delivery models are experiencing growing pressure, 
which is in turn contributing to increasing delivery times and costs.  In particular it identifies 
and characterises three issues that help explain increasing delivery times and costs: the 
increasing complexity in the commodity itself; the challenges of coordinating and scheduling 
delivery of increasing complex product; and the impacts of poor quality work. In light of these 
findings, the paper argues for the importance of examining the operations of the housing 
building industry, and the nature of the commodity itself, in better understanding the drivers 
of increasing delivery times and increasing costs in the supply of suburban housing. 
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Introduction 
Completion times for new housing have been increasing in Australia and are contributing to 
the continuing undersupply of new housing. Undersupply is an important issue because it 
contributes to house price increases, rent increases in the private rental market and limits 
the capacity of social housing providers to procure new affordable rental housing. There has 
been vigorous debate over the causes of undersupply, which has led to research on the 
urban land availability, planning policy and under utilised land. However, there has been little 
research on the housing industry itself. This is the gap that this research seeks to fill, at least 
in part, by focussing on the way the housing industry produces detached suburban housing 
that continues to form the overwhelming share of new residential production. The research is 
based upon the simple proposition that what is produced by the housing industry and how it 
is produced should be considered in relation to housing under supply. 
 
This paper presents initial findings from a research project titled “Australian suburban house 
building: industry organisation, practices and constraints” funded by the Australian Housing 
and Urban Research Institute.  It begins by describing housing supply in Australia, and the 
nature of the housing supply industry. In doing so it draws on the findings presented in the 
AHURI positioning paper associated with this program of research (Dalton et al 2011). In 
presenting an initial examination of the house building industry in Australia, the positioning 
paper identifies three factors as having significant impact on housing completing times: 
quality control; construction management; and rising complexity of the commodity.  This 
paper aims to build on the work of the position paper, providing further investigation of these 
factors based on data collected on the house building industry.  The data sources used 
includes semi structured interviews and an industry focus group. Twenty interviews were 
conducted in 2011 with volume house builder managers, including directors, design 
managers, construction managers and supervisors; and tradespeople, supply and install 
contractors and other service providers.  The focus group, conducted in December 2011, 
brought together a similar group of industry participants to meet with the project team for the 
purpose of testing and elaborating on the findings presented in the positioning paper. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of emerging industry reaction and response to the key 
issues identified in the body of the paper. 
 
The problem: housing supply 
Evidence that the supply of new housing is inadequate is broadly recognised by the Federal 
government with the 2008 budget stating that ‘housing supply has not kept pace with 
demand’ (Australian Government 2008); the National Housing Supply Council (2010:64) 
identifying ‘a cumulative shortfall of 178,400 dwellings’; and the Council of Australian 
Governments (2009) noting that housing supply is not responding adequately to increasing 
demand.  The issue of housing undersupply is also identified by industry representatives, 
with the Housing Industry Association (2010a) and Master Builders Association (2010) 
presenting estimates of undersupply. There are many factors that could potentially be 
contributing to undersupply, but attention has focused on issues of land availability and 
planning policy rather than the housing industry itself. 
 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) provides time series data on the completion time 
for detached dwellings (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008). Figure 1 indicates that the 
average construction time for detached housing increased in the late eighties, declined in the 
early nineties, stayed relatively stable during the mid nineties and began to increase in the 
late nineties and continued to increase during the naughties.  Figure 2 presents data for 
completion times against the number of completions for the 2000-2008 period. It shows that 
the average Australian house completion time has risen from 1.8 quarters to 2.4 quarters 
while the number of house completions has stayed relatively stable at around 27,000 houses 
per quarter (Gharaie et al. 2010). 
 
Figure 1: Average number of quarters to complete new houses - Australia 
 
 
Figure 2: Average house completion times and number completed, quarterly - Australia 
 
 
Two factors, which are often suggested as causing increased completion times, are house 
size increases and labour availability. In relation to house size the data shows that the 
increase in completion times has not been accompanied by increases in floor space. In 
recent years the growth in the average floor size of dwellings has flattened out, and indeed is 
beginning to decline (Gharaie 2011). It now seems that the long term growth in the average 
size of Australian housing has ceased and we can conclude that the increase in completion 
times, at least in recent years, is not due to increase in floor size. 
 
Continuing shortages of labour is regularly identified as a key driver of delayed construction 
times by industry associations (Housing Industry Association 2010b; Master Builders 
Association 2010). The HIA uses its quarterly survey, the HIA – Austral Bricks Trades Report 
(HIA Economics Group 2011), to make this case.  Figure 3 presents residential housing 
employment, dwelling completions data, and the HIA trade availability index.  ABS data 
shows consistent long-term growth in residential building construction employment of 
approximately 2.8 per-cent per-annum from the mid 1980s while the output of dwellings has 
remained roughly constant.  It should be noted that the labour force reported in the ABS data 
is distributed across both the new build and the renovation sectors, with no data source that 
tells us how this growing labour force is distributed across these two sub-sectors.  However, 
as Figure 3 highlights, there is no clear relationship between the HIA trade availability index 
and either house completion numbers or labour supply.  
 
Figure 3: Number of dwelling completions, residential building construction employed persons 
and trade availability index 
 
 
In summary, the significant increase in the time to build new houses clearly has implications 
for overall housing supply and points to changed conditions in the nature of supply.  It thus 
highlights the condition of supply as a key area of concern.  The residential building industry 
is a dynamic and complex industry where care has to be taken in explaining phenomena 
including increasing completion times.  However, it would seem that that increasing 
completion times cannot be simply ascribed to increasing house size or labour shortages.  
As such, there is a need to further examine the operations of the house building industry 
itself in relation to undersupply and completion times. 
 
 
The housing industry 
The following section presents a brief description of the way in which volume builders 
produce new houses to provide context for an investigation of the issues of undersupply and 
increasing completion times.  The largest share of new housing in Australia is built on vacant 
land on the fringe of large metropolitan capital and provincial cities (Goodman et al. 2009). 
The serviced land is produced by land developers who sell the land either to purchasers who 
then contract with a builder for a house, or directly to the builder who builds for sale to a 
future purchaser. New residential housing is produced by businesses that range from the 
very small, producing just a few dwellings each year, to the large ‘volume’ builders (Dalton et 
al. 2011). In 2008-2009 the largest volume builder commenced nearly 3800 dwellings while 
the 100th ranked builder commenced 83 dwellings (Housing Industry Association 2009).  In 
sum, the largest 100 builders commenced 37 per-cent of all residential dwellings. The 
builders produce houses for two types of customers. ‘Spec’ houses are built ‘speculatively’ 
by the builder and when completed sold to a purchaser. ‘Customer’ houses are built to order 
for a known purchaser. Builders are constantly adjusting the proportions of ‘specs’ and 
‘customer’ houses in response to changing market conditions.   
 
The organisation structure typical of volume house building companies in Australia has 
remained relatively consistent since its development by AV Jennings in the post WWII period 
(Garden 1992).  The corporate structure is typically supported by internal groups for sales, 
marketing, ordering, design, occupational health and safety and research and development, 
with production delivered by construction managers and supervisors. Each construction 
manager is typically responsible for 5 or 6 supervisors, who are in-turn responsible for the 
construction of up to 15 houses at any one time.   
 
Housing continues to be produced by skilled tradespersons, such as carpenters, plumbers, 
electricians, plasterers and painters; and new house building remains labour intensive on-
site, despite increasing use of pre-fabricated components, such as roof trusses, upper floor 
joists, windows, doors, staircases, cupboards and cabinets (Dalton et al. 2011).  The volume 
house building industry has developed an explicit and carefully documented contract system 
based on an extensive breakdown of the component parts of the typical house. Three forms 
of contracts form the basis for the contract system: supplier contracts, relating to the supply 
of building materials; supply and install contracts, relating to contractors who both supply 
materials and install them; and subcontracts, relating to trades to who are engaged to carry 
out specific work. Further, some supply and install contracts are for construction support 
services such as temporary fencing, scaffolding, and guard rails.   
 
Given this complex contracting arrangement, each house can be seen as being delivered 
though a temporary organisation.  Cherns and Bryant (1984:181) describe the temporary 
organisation “as an engagement of parts of several separate and diverse organisations – 
client, consultants, contractors etc. – for the limited and finite purpose of bringing a building 
into being from inception to completion”.  Figure 4 illustrates the key relationships that 
builders enter into as they form multiple ‘temporary organisations’ that build suburban 
houses. 
 
Figure 4: House Builders’ organisational chart 
 
(Dalton et al 2011) 
 
The paper turns now to a detailed examination of three factors identified in field research as 
being key factors in escalating completion times: quality control; construction management; 
the rising complexity of the commodity; and external controls.  
 
Quality Control 
Poor quality work extends completion times because it requires rework. While evidence of 
the level of poor quality work is hard to identify, building surveyors, a key part of quality 
assurance for the client, provide an important perspective.  One building surveyor 
interviewed reports that “pre-slabs and steels are probably refused 10 to 15 percent of the 
time” and timber frames “probably 70 percent of the time” and “finals are probably, yeah, 
about 50 percent”.  Another indication of the extent of defects in new house construction is 
the proportion of jobs that are inspected more than the times allowed for in the initial 
agreement (usually 4-6). This building surveyor reports that it would be “probably 30 percent 
of the jobs”.  While agreeing that identification of poor quality work is on the rise, an industry 
peak body representative offered this qualification:  
I get a bit concerned about the defects issue...  it's not the fact that the defects have 
increased, I think the defects have decreased, but the identification and the 
intractability of disputes has increased.   
 
Interviewees frequently raised a connection between poor quality work and increasing 
demarcation of trades, especially carpentry and plumbing. In both trades, there are typically 
2-4 different sub-contractors involved on site. The following exchange in the focus group 
demonstrates this frustration: 
In the early days we used to have a carpenter would do the whole lot, frame, lock ups, 
etc, etc.  Now we’ve got the framers, then we’ve got specialised guys who are coming 
to do our lockups, etc etc… Now, the framer couldn't give a rats about the next guy” 
[Expressions of agreement] Queensland’s still a little bit backwards [sarcasm]; they still 
have a framer who’s accountable for his frame and the entire frame.  There’s no lock 
up carpenter’s going to come and fix it up for him, he’s responsible for it.  So there’s no 
getting away with doing a bodgey frame and then having to pay a lockup carpenter 
three times as much to fix up his frame. 
 
Product delivery – supervision and scheduling 
A very large number of subcontracts, supply contracts and supply and install contracts have 
to be successfully established and scheduled during the building of a house. This leads to 
questions about how successful and timely is the scheduling process during construction.  It 
is estimated that 80-110 contracts are required to build a suburban dwelling. Table 1 shows 
the potential number of contracts for each of the major stages in the delivery of a typical 
suburban house.  The sequencing of these contracts is a crucial aspect of house building.  
 
All three forms of contractors (supply, install, supply and install) depend on the delivery of 
materials and completion of work of other contractors. Further, some contractors can only 
undertake their work, such as a roofing contractor, if they are the only contractor on site, 
while others require some on-site interaction.  Given the large number of subcontracts, 
supply contracts and supply and install contracts that have to be successfully organised and 
scheduled during the building of a house, the question arises as to how successful and 
timely is this scheduling process during construction of the average house?  
 
Table 1: Number of contracts for stages in construction of typical suburban house 
 
Building element Number of potential 
contracts 
Site preparation  7 
Building envelope  38 
Dwelling service systems  11 
Fixtures and fittings 28 
Finishings and furnishings  5 
External living and landscape  6 
Building site services  12 
Source: Data provided by volume builders 
 
The indications are that timely scheduling is a major issue in the industry. One industry 
construction manager offers this appraisal of the state of site supervision: 
You know anybody can call up this and get the fascia going and the roof on, but all of a 
sudden if the bricklayer’s bricked up the house and he doesn’t do a good job or the 
framer, the walls are out of plumb, and the house is plastered, you know and painted, 
all of sudden, it's oh we better go back and fix this, we’ve got to fix that and we’ve got 
to pull the brickwork down on this side of the house… So we’re not supervising and not 
building a quality home… and we’re guilty of paying [contractors] and saying, you’ve 
done a good job without supervising it and then we come back and go, oh crap that is 
a crap job.  We now need to go back and fix that. 
 
The trades themselves offer a different perspective, but support the argument that site 
supervision is not up to scratch in the context of increasingly complex designs and 
increasingly complex contracting arrangements. A representative of a plastering company 
described the situation regarding deficient site project management and scheduling by 
supervisors in the following terms:  
On average, 50 percent of the jobs we get called to start on a particular day, are not 
ready for us to start … The major issues tend to be unsafe sites, followed by 
insufficient noggings on changing directions … and edge parameters of garages and 
alfrescos and things like that … [or] the roof’s not on or parts of the roof aren’t on. The 
flashings aren’t in. 
Similarly, a plumber describes the situation in the following terms:  
[The supervisor] will say, ‘I want it done next Thursday on the 5th,’ or whatever it might 
be. ‘Yeah, no worries’. We would ask a series of questions and make sure that 
everything’s ready … And you know, that's where it all buggers up … for example they 
book for a hot and cold rough in and yeah the frame’s all finished but we get there and 
the trusses aren’t … you get everything ready … the day before, the guys come in, 
load the truck up… [but] we get there and the tiler is there [and] because of OH&S, we 
can’t work underneath the tiler. 
 
Increasing complexity and its impacts 
The dramatic increase in the complexity of the housing product of the last 5-10 years has 
emerged as a critical factor in completion times, and is closely linked to issues of site 
supervision and quality control.  This period has seen a significant shift from single to double 
story construction; escalating design complexity; and an increasing range of product 
offerings and potential for purchaser customisation. 
 
House size – more double story houses 
It is evident from an examination of volume builder catalogues, and from interview data, that 
the proportion of two-storey new houses has increased.  A volume builder company director 
outlined the history of the shift to ‘doubles’: 
[About] fifteen years ago … we went from single story and starting creating affordability 
into double storey and brought double storey into the market big time.  And I think 
when I was at Jennings many moons ago, it was predominantly single storey 
production and our mix now would be, you know at some stage it got up to 60% double 
storey and 40% single.  So all of a sudden double storeys came into the volume 
building market where it wasn’t before, so that was a big influence on building times. 
 
In part this shift appears to be a consequence of reducing land lot sizes.  The combined 
impact of a decrease in average lot size (driven by compact city and affordable housing 
policy agendas and land prices), and simultaneously an increase in house size from the mid 
1980s led to an increase in the proportion of double story housing. Squeezing larger houses 
on smaller blocks has added complexity to building footprint layouts, as footprints now 
frequently extend to occupy the maximum allowable built form footprint.  A company director 
highlights the disconnect between ‘one size fits all’ volume housing and increasingly 
restrictive building envelopes that result from smaller lots: 
Before every house used to fit every lot, now what do we do?  We have to change 
every lot to get good solar orientation.  The industry simply isn’t equipped for that.  
When we build display villages, it's on the basis that every house fits every lot, well it 
doesn’t.  What does it mean?  It all boils down to; we never ever build the same house 
twice, guys…  So how on earth can we build to the same time frames as we did before 
when every house is difficult, well almost every house is difficult. 
 Double story houses add further complexity in a number of ways. They add complexity to 
design and engineering, requiring staircases, first storey floors, external cladding that is 
different to ground floor cladding, and increased use of machinery to lift and construct the 
upper floor.  Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) requirements become more onerous, 
with void protection needed, greater use of scaffolding and height protection. These changes 
have led to an increase in the number of contracts required to build a house and increased 
the complexity of interactions with subcontractors and supply and install contractors 
highlighted in the previous section.  Building sites are also now more constrained. This has 
impacts on the delivery of materials, with less room to accommodate multiple materials; the 
temporary installation of scaffolding; and the ability for multiple trades to work onsite at a 
given time. One materials supplier commented that they were frequently unable to off-load 
their deliveries on-site because access was blocked by a stockpile of other building material. 




Design of volume house product has been evolving since its origins post world war II.  
However the late 1990s into 2000s has seen a dramatic escalation of design complexity.  
The last decade in particular has seen an ‘aspiration arms race’ at play in the volume builder 
sector in Australia, with building companies continually striving to maintain or increase 
market share by offering more complex and more customisable housing product.  As one 
company director puts it: “We’re building space ships compared to what we were building 10 
years ago”.  This increase in complexity is illustrated in Figure 5, where a photograph of a 
1960s double-fronted cream brick veneer house sits alongside a current house being offered 
in a volume builder’s catalogue. 
 
Figure 5: 1960s cream brick veneer and current house design 
 
 
The impact of this escalating design complexity on the industry’s ability to deliver product is 
dramatic and widespread and was frequently brought up in interviews with both house 
building companies and trades.  Every trade has their story of the impacts of increasing 
complexity for their work. A bricklayer with 30 years experience reflects on the increasingly 
complex facades incorporating mixed materials :  
 You have that many ins and outs on a house, all the different facades, there’s half-
rendered half brickwork. There’s so many different facades that jobs are just a lot more 
complicated than they were (Bricklayer).  
Plasters highlight the increase in ‘fiddly’ elements like exposed corners, and the move to 
square set cornices.  Plumbers highlight the increasing complexity in flashings, and their 
increasing reliance on other trades and therefore the scheduling of site supervisors, to 
enable installation.  An experienced site supervisor provides an example of the impact that 
increasing design complexity can have on supervision: 
… like the front façade with the box gutters before you can keep plastering, or else 
you’ll flood the house out. Whereas before you could more or less plaster the house 
before the bricklayer even started, because it was water tight, because we didn’t have 
these box gutters, but it was just normal roofs, and you could plaster, and the 
bricklayer could work around when the plasterers are plastering. 
A senior manager form the industry sums up this increasing complexity for trades: 
…in the past you had a bricklayer and he’d do the whole outside and it was finished.  
Whereas now you may have matrix panel which involves a carpenter.  You’ve got 
foam which involves a renderer, you’ve got tiles on the front which involves a tiler.  So 
it's no longer one trade doing the outside veneer.  It's now four or five trades, so that’s 
where the time goes and everytime you bring another trade in, it's another lost period 
of time. 
 
In addition to rising complexity, the turnover of design is increasing, with products and 
display villages being turned over every few years, where in the past it was more like 5-6 
years.  
The product  life cycles are shorter therefore the whole learning experience that 
always happens on a new model and you don't get into that rhythm like when I was at 
Jennings, that’s the product, you have six to pick from (Company Director). 
 
Product range and customisation 
There has been an increase in the number of house models and options on offer to 
customers. Typically, volume builders have house design catalogues with many models, and 
with floor plan and façade options (see Table 2). Purchasers can also add kitchen, 
bathroom, external living area and laundry features, and up-grade items such as doors and 
windows. In sum, there appears to be less and less standardisation of new housing design 
and production. 
…we’ve got 80, 80 house plans, or 80 house types, you’ve got generally, you know, 
sort of eight facades, or four to eight facades, so you know, there’s 640 different things 
you can do there.  Plus then you’ve got ten options within those, and so the 
maintenance of those master drawings, you know, we got four guys basically just 
banging away on keeping them up to date (marketing manager). 
 













HIA top 100 
2009/2010 3rd 5th 7th 8th 
Number of models 69 41 52 27 
Floor plan options Between 1-4 Between 1-4 Between 1-5 Between 1-4 
Façade options Between 2-9 Between 2-7 Between 1-13 Between 1-6 
Source: Volume builder catalogues on the world wide web. 
 
All of the major building companies interviewed identified display homes as being critical to 
sales strategy.  The display village house is typically at the top level of specification, if not 
further customised, in an effort to ‘sell the dream’.  As one marketing manager explains: 
Our philosophy is to really trick up the display home to wow people and show them the 
dream, but then we start from, well here’s the base... specification and then here’s all 
what we call standard options that they can upgrade to. 
 
Sales strategies often offer a huge array of options for customers to customize their 
purchase, helping to create the sense of a ‘unique’ purchase for the client, and helping to 
ensure that an extensive range of client expectations can be catered for with a given 
company’s catalogue. Many specified options are aesthetic such as internal finishes and 
colours and have limited impact on the buildability of a house. However, some can have a 
significant impact of the standard build, such as façade options.  While façade options 
generally focus on altering finishing materials, they often extend to reconfigurations of the 
façade construction, and sometimes require modifications to the rest of the house structure 
by requiring changes to roof lines, garages, or other elements. Other structural options that 
significantly change ‘standard’ floor plans might include an extra room (such as a rumpus 
room); alfresco area; or larger garage.  Industry respondents commonly identified the 
pressure to go beyond standard ‘options’ and provide further customisation to meet 
customer expectations, as a marketing manager explains:   
[The customer] will play off one builder against the other, “That one can offer me this.”  
You know and our sales force will say, “Well I will offer you that too.”  So that might be 
a structural change of whatever it is. 
In such instances the product being offered is moving even further away form the concept of 
volume housing towards bespoke design.  
 
Emerging response 
When attention turns to the operation of the volume house building industry in Australia what 
becomes evident is an industry undergoing significant stress.  This research identifies 
factors impacting on the supply side of the housing market, in particular the limitations of 
existing organisational arrangements; the challenges posed by rising levels of building 
complexity and pressure to offer customisable product; and the associated challenge of 
maintaining quality in the face of such complexity.  
 
The organisational structures that exist today evolved over a period when volume housing 
emerged as a means to deliver high numbers of cheaper and largely standardised housing 
product. It is in such an environment that the organisational structure of construction 
managers, site supervisors, and contract management was refined.  The last decade has 
seen a significant change in this context, with increasing complexity in housing, tighter 
regulatory requirements; and a diminishing role for ‘spec’ housing heaping ever more 
demands on supervisors and managers.  The industry has now moved to an era of complex 
designs and constant change in design, extensive product catalogues and customisation 
options, with design innovation leading housing delivery.  As a housing building company 
director describes: 
It comes down to competition … we all compete for the same buyer and we’re out 
there rationing out our display homes.  We hold onto display homes for a couple of 
years now, whereas back in the Jennings days, you’d have them open for five years 
wouldn't you, the same model.  Pumping them out.  Now as soon as we open one, [our 
competitors] will be out there looking at it and ratcheting it up and it's just being 
ratcheted up all the time. 
It is clear that the industry is wedded to design led product development and customisable 
product offerings.  Builders are competing for market attention with increasingly complex and 
diverse products that are further customisable when tailored to a particular customer and 
their block of land on a new estate.  As another company director comments, “if someone 
said let’s just build stock standard, they’d probably be out of business in days”. 
 The industry has thus moved, over the past few decades, from one based on carefully 
managed and standardised craft production to one of extensive customisation, without any 
significant industrialisation of the house building process along the way.  There is recognition 
amongst some senior members of the house building industry that this has resulted in 
significant stress on the industries ability to deliver timely and affordable housing; and that 
innovation and change in the management and process of volume house building is required 
to better meet the present day operating conditions.  However, given the competitive nature 
of the industry for customer sales, the ‘aspirational arms race’ is seemingly accepted as 
inevitable by many in the industry. Therefore very few house building companies are 
pursuing a strategy of simpler housing product in an effort to cut cost and rein in complexity 
and its impact on building efficiency.  Rather, the response is focused on trying to refine and 
adapt existing systems and processes in order to cope with customisation - striving for 
‘manageable customisation’.  As one manager noted: 
We can be highly customised, but we need to make sure [of] operational efficiency …  
We are really trying to drive operational efficiency so that we can handle 
customisation. 
Part of the challenge for volume house builders therefore becomes striking the right balance 
between ‘volume delivery’ and the sense of ‘uniqueness’ for customers.  In other words their 
strategy is to maintain their ability to offer customisation, but do so efficiently.  A marketing 
manager describes the strategy. 
We had … a no variation policy, which meant is all you could have is standard options, 
facades and as I said, three car garages or you know, a rumpus room out the back or 
an outdoor room or whatever it is.  But there is a lot of non standard variations, still. 
And I guess what we are trying to do, is be a volume builder with standard product, but 
still have high customisation, but do it easily…  And do it easily is not just get it through 
the sales contracting phase but build it as well. 
 
In an effort to ensure the buildability of complex and customised designs there is evidence of 
building technology responses. However, while innovation in building technology is evident, 
in large part efforts to improve buildability seem to focus on simplifying construction 
techniques while maintaining design integrity.  This is particularly evident in the use of 
structural steel, a material that in theory enables more cost effective structural solutions for 
the large span open plan areas and external openings that are a feature of contemporary 
design, but in practice frequently contribute to delays and defects in house construction.  
Thus we have the following strategic response from one major house building company:      
 …we are trying to build steel out if we can, you know and because it requires again 
the coordination of a framing carpenter with his steel fabricator or your installer and 
what not… (marketing manager).  
Other similar responses, here from another marketing manager in a major building company, 
relate to the use of box gutters.   
...well I guess we design within a few rules.  Like Queensland for instance they 
wouldn’t let us use any box gutters.  They just said “It’s just off the, off the table”… 
they’ve caused problems in the past and now it’s basically just a, a hands off, we don’t 
want to do that (marketing manager).  
 
There is recognition from industry leaders that many of the elements that are potentially 
impacting on quality and build times are difficult for individual companies to tackle, such as 
the way trades are organised (for example the division between frame and fit-off carpenters), 
or the lack of a trade base to install new innovative materials.  Several senior managers and 
company directors commented on the need for a more coordinated whole of industry shift in 
many areas.  Many agreed that a dedicated forum to consider weaknesses in the 
organisation of the industry is required.  The point was made that existing national peak 
organisations representing the industry are in the main focussed on broader industry 
conditions and public policy issues.  These organisations do not have internal forums for 
discussing the organisation of the industry itself.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper extends the presentation of findings of research in Dalton et al (2011) on 
suburban house building that is seeking to explain why the length of time taken to build 
houses has been increasing.  It does this by focussing on three key features of 
contemporary suburban house building by volume builders: the quality of work performed by 
tradespeople; supervision and scheduling of the work done on site; and the nature of the 
houses themselves.  Based on interview and focus group data these factors have been 
confirmed as significant and their analysis extended.  It confirms that extensive defects, 
requiring rework, extends construction times. It also confirms that supervision and 
scheduling of construction is a significant issue.  There is evidence that a proportion of 
supervisors lack the skills to properly schedule work and ensure quality standards are met.  
Finally, there is the nature of the housing product being built which has made it more difficult 
to build to a good standard and on time.    
 
It is this third feature, the nature of the housing product, which is most important.  There are 
two aspects of the changing nature of the housing product that matter.  First, houses 
designed and built by volume builders have become more complex.  These new 
complexities are found in façade designs, rooves and box gutters, increasing variety of 
materials, larger unsupported spans, absence of ceiling cornices and increasing proportion 
of glass windows in external walls.  This has come out of what some in the industry describe 
as an ‘aspirational arms race’. It has its origins in the interactions of competing builders and 
consumers who respond to advertising, visit display villages and devote time and effort to 
comparing what is on offer from these builders.  Second, there has been less and less 
standardisation of house designs and features.  The number of models has increased along 
with the opportunity for purchasers to customise their selected design and to add in optional 
extras.  In other words there is increasing variety in the product.   
 
This proliferation of designs and customisation of designs by purchasers now resembles the 
phenomena of ‘mass customisation’ evident in other product markets in capitalist societies.  
Mass customisation is evident when companies seek to build in to mass production 
processes the ability to cater to differing customer needs and thus provide increasingly 
differentiated products, as they seek grow markets and compete for market share (Bardakci 
and Whitelock 2003).  The starting point is the typical Fordist mass production process and 
the challenge is to maintain the efficiencies of mass production while at the same time 
introducing some variability in the product.  This drive towards ‘mass customisation’ of new 
housing design and production has also been evident in the in a number of other countries, 
in particular the UK (Barlow 1999; Leishman and Warren 2006; Benros and Durate 2009) 
and Japan (Barlow and Ozaki 2003), where the sameness of housing product has been 
seen as a problem. 
 
Comparison between the development of ‘mass customisation in housing production’ in 
Australia and the UK and Japan however cannot be taken very far.  The starting points are 
different.  In the UK and Japan housing there has been a significant prior industrialisation of 
housing production.  Builders in the post war period have been influenced by Fordist 
production thinking in they way they have designed and produced houses.  In contrast in 
Australia, while there has been much standardisation in volume house building, there has 
been no industrialisation of housing design and production.  Volume house building in 
Australia continues to be based upon specialised craft production, organised through an 
elaborate system of sub-contracting. While the growth of a small number of builders, now 
described as volume builders, has led to some efficiencies, there has been no 
industrialisation of housing construction beyond factory based prefabrication of a few 
components.  ‘Mass customisation’ therefore is a market development that has been grafted 
onto a continuing craft production model.   
 Much of the research evidence in this paper has come from the ranks of senior employees 
and managers in volume house builders. They are keenly aware of the challenge that the 
combination of poor quality on-site work and the skill deficits of supervisors, with the 
proliferation of complex house designs, present to the industry.  They are responding by 
refining and adapting management systems, and trying to simplify some design features 
while maintaining scope for customisation.  However, the findings from this research pose 
questions regarding the ability for existing organisational arrangement, skill bases, and 
production methods to deliver increasingly complex and customisable product.   The 
research suggests that the refinement of production process has limited potential to 
reconcile these processes to the demands of customisable product offerings with economic 
efficiency and timely product delivery.  Ultimately the craft production model may not be 
robust enough for future improvement of the efficiency of suburban housing production. 
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